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The relation between the intensity of competition and R&D investment
has received a lot of attention, both in the theoretical and in the empir-
ical literature. Nevertheless, no consensus on the sign of the effect of
competition on innovation has emerged. This survey of the literature
identifies sources of confusion in the theoretical debate. My discussion
is mainly based on a unified model that simplifies the comparison of
different results. This model is also applied to show which factors work
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1
Introduction
Many policy issues require an understanding of the relation between
competition and innovation. Should competition policy take the effects
of mergers on innovative activity into account, and would one expect
these effects to be positive or negative? Should entry into monopo-
listic markets (e.g., in network industries) be supported with a view
toward the effects on innovation? Should competitive procurement be
encouraged because of potential positive effects on innovation? Does
the consideration of effects on innovation provide additional arguments
for globalization?
Conceptually, the question whether one should foster competition
because of concerns for innovation falls into two parts. First, does
more competition lead to more innovation? Second, is more innova-
tion desirable? The second point is often taken for granted. Innovation
is regarded as an “engine for economic growth” and growth is regarded
as desirable. Clearly, however, innovation has benefits and costs, and
it does not take a lot of fantasy to construct simple arguments for
why firms may innovate too much.1 In this monograph, I will focus
1For instance, Tirole (1988, Ch. 2) argues that even a monopolist may oversupply rather
than undersupply quality relative to a social planner.
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on the first question, investigating the relation between competition
and innovation, without necessarily implying that more innovation is
desirable.
The analysis of the question has a long history. On the one hand,
there is the Schumpeterian tradition emphasizing that monopoly rents
are necessary to give incentives for innovation. On the other hand,
there is the view that competition puts the necessary pressure on firms
(and, in particular, on managers) to exert innovative effort, which is
summarized most succinctly in the famous statement that “The best
of all monopoly profits is a quiet life” (Hicks, 1935). The search for
a better understanding of the topic has generated a cottage industry
of a considerable size. Over several decades, there has been a constant
flow of theoretical papers on the topic, both from a partial equilibrium
(industrial organization) and from a general equilibrium (growth the-
ory) perspective, and there is no sign that the flow of papers is abating.
This interest is reflected in the empirical literature: The question has
been dubbed the “second-most tested hypothesis in industrial organi-
zation” (Aghion and Tirole, 1994).
Of course, the continuing flow of research reflects a state of affairs
that is highly unattractive from a policy point of view, namely that
neither the theoretical nor the empirical research on the subject is
very conclusive. Depending on the particular notion of competition, the
underlying oligopoly model or the type of innovation, one can arrive
at positive, negative, inverted-U-shaped, or even U-shaped relations
between competition and innovation. This would be no problem if it
were easy to say which economic fundamentals drive the different pre-
dictions. Unfortunately, in many cases seemingly innocuous modeling
details can have a substantial effect on the predictions. The usual solu-
tion would be to search enlightenment through empirical analysis. How-
ever, it would take a rather selective view of the empirical literature
to arrive at a clear conclusion. One can find empirical support for just
about any relation between competition and innovation, including the
possibility that there is no significant relation at all.
It is therefore not surprising that even distinguished scholars come
to quite different conclusions about what we have learnt. In spite of a
qualifying footnote, Aghion et al. (2005, 2009) are quite definite in their
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assessment, at least as far as the theoretical industrial organization
literature is concerned.
“Theories of industrial organization typically pre-
dict that innovation should decline with competition”.2
Vives (2008, p. 419), one of the leading IO theorists, takes the oppo-
site view:
“Does competition foster innovation? The answer is
a qualified yes”.
One might therefore want to side with Gilbert (2006, p. 162) who
formulates the state of affairs as follows:
“Economic theory supports neither the view that
market power generally threatens innovation by lower-
ing the return to innovative efforts nor the Schumpete-
rian view that concentrated markets generally promote
innovation.”
His assessment of the empirical literature is similar:
“. . . empirical studies have not generated clear con-
clusions about the relationship between competition
and innovation. . . (Gilbert, 2006, p. 162)”.
In this monograph, I will abstain from giving another full-fledged
treatment of the existing literature. The number of surveys in the field
is so large that it would be hard to come up with anything but a
summary and update of existing surveys. Rather, this monograph has
a narrower goal. I will try to provide a simple framework that helps to
understand two issues:
1. What are the sources of the ambiguous relation between
competition and innovation?
2 Importantly, the growth-theoretic work of Aghion and co-authors themselves comes to
different conclusions. This will be discussed in Section 6.3.
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2. Which factors (firm characteristics, market characteristics,
characteristics of the innovation) are conducive to a positive
relation between competition and innovation?
This monograph attempts to make some progress on these two
issues. To this end, I will take a subjective look at the existing litera-
ture. Section 2 identifies the first source of ambiguity. Roughly speak-
ing, innovation incentives are the difference between the profits of a firm
if it invests (ex post profits) and profits if it does not invest (ex ante
profits). Any change in parameters that reduces ex post profits with-
out affecting ex ante profits reduces innovation incentives and, con-
versely, any change in parameters that reduces ex ante profits without
affecting ex post profits increases innovation incentives. However, most
interesting parameterizations of competition tend to reduce ex post
and ex ante profits, so that the net effect is unclear without further
qualification.
In the remainder of the monograph, I will therefore consider such
parameterizations. In Section 3, I will review a simple framework that
I introduced in a more technical companion paper (Schmutzler, 2010).
This framework is general enough to contain the simple introductory
examples and many familiar models from the literature as special cases.
It is a two-stage model with an investment stage preceding product
market competition. The product market stage is kept general, encom-
passing most common oligopoly models. The competition parameter
is defined through a set of abstract properties that are fulfilled for
most standard parameterizations of competition. The analysis reveals
four simple transmission channels by which the intensity of competition
affects innovation.3 It becomes clear that these four individual effects
work in different directions. Without specifying the framework further,
it is impossible to say which effects dominate. Thus, one can clearly
understand the sources of the ambiguity. Thereby, one obtains a use-
ful tool for discussing the intuition for the effects of competition on
innovation.
3Competition affects equilibrium outputs and margins and the sensitivity of these quantities
to marginal costs.
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As an illustration, I will then consider several simple examples in
Section 4. This serves three purposes. First, the examples help to under-
stand the different possible meanings of competition. Second, we see
that even within this small set of simple examples, the effects of com-
petition on innovation are ambiguous. Third, the examples are useful
to identify the sources of ambiguities.
In Section 5, I then extend the analysis to deal with asymmetric
firms. There are several reasons for doing this. First, even though the
framework is static, it is useful for discussing some basic ideas about an
interesting aspect of market dynamics. A central question on the long-
run behavior of markets is whether initial differences between firms
are self-reinforcing. A large literature has dealt with the countervail-
ing effects emerging in this context. Some of these effects can already
be sketched in the simple static framework introduced here. This dis-
cussion is interesting in its own right, but will also be important in
the subsequent analysis of the effects of competition on investment
with asymmetric firms. Second, the asymmetric framework is useful
to obtain a first idea about the circumstances leading to a positive
effect of competition on investment. A robust result is that in environ-
ments where competition has a positive effect on laggards (relatively
inefficient firms), it will typically also have a positive effect on lead-
ers (relatively efficient firms), whereas the converse statement is not
true. This suggests that the analysis must take firm-specific effects into
account: The aggregate impact of competition on investment may hide
heterogeneous effects on different firms.
Even though the two-stage model is general in some respects, it is
oversimplified in others. In Section 6, I therefore treat various exten-
sions of the simple framework that have received some attention in
the literature. For instance, I consider the possibility of endogenous
entry of firms, and separation of ownership and control. I also provide
some thoughts on product innovations, even though the literature is
less well developed than the literature on process innovations. These
modifications tend to suggest a more positive effect of competition on
investment. Finally, I briefly deal with growth-theoretic papers. These
papers usually contain simple two-stage oligopoly models as a building
block, but to obtain a full understanding of the effects of competition
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on investment, the interaction between different markets needs to be
considered.
I move toward the empirical literature in Section 7. My treatment of
this huge body of research is eclectic. I focus on contributions that I find
useful in the context of the theoretical ideas that I am pursuing here.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, I will argue that, some recent progress notwith-
standing, the empirical literature mirrors the unsatisfactory state of
affairs in theory, leaving the average reader at least as confused. More-
over, it is often hard to understand the relation between the theoretical
models and the empirical approaches. I will therefore also summarize
a few contributions that have dealt with the relation between competi-
tion and innovation in laboratory experiments. Experiments have the
advantage that they can be directly tailored to test specific models.
Section 8 contains some concluding remarks.
In line with the restricted scope of this endeavor, I am omitting
many interesting papers on the relation between competition and inno-
vation. This is not only true for the empirical work, but also for theory.
The treatment of the growth literature, for instance, is very brief,
focussing on one paper that is particularly relevant for the purposes
of this survey. Also, I do not even touch the literature on patent races
and research tournaments.4 This literature is characterized by the prop-
erty that, even when many firms exert effort, only a small number of
them (usually one) can benefit from the fruits of the innovation. Explor-
ing the relation of this literature to the “non-tournament” approaches
discussed here would be interesting, but is beyond the scope of this
monograph.
4See for instance, Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980) for examples of the former
and Taylor (1995) for examples of the latter; Fullerton et al. (1999) et al. provides an
experimental analysis of research tournaments.
2
Ex post versus Ex ante Competition
Throughout most of this monograph, I shall consider changes in the
competitive environment that affect the firms no matter whether they
innovate or not. For instance, globalization (integration of markets)
typically changes the profits of firms with innovation (ex post) and
without innovation (ex ante). For conceptual clarity, it is nevertheless
useful to isolate the role of each of these two effects on innovation
incentives.
2.1 Ex post Market Structure
Consider an innovation that reduces marginal costs by some amount
∆ > 0.1 Compare two environments which differ only with respect to
the ex post situation (after the investment).
Ex ante, there is some set of firms which, for simplicity, we assume
to be symmetric, so that each of them earns identical profits Π0.
Suppose that, with weak competition, the innovator earns monopoly
profits ΠW1 = Π
M (∆), whereas with intense competition profits are
ΠI1 < Π
M (∆). For instance, one can think of weak competition as
1Unless otherwise mentioned, I will confine myself to firms with constant marginal costs.
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corresponding to strict patent protection, whereas there are spillovers
to competitors with intense competition.
The value of the innovation for the case of low ex post competition
(the resulting profit increase) is:
V W = ΠW1 − Π0 = ΠM (∆) − Π0.
The value of the innovation for the case of intense ex post compe-
tition is:
V I = ΠI1 − Π0 < ΠM (∆) − Π0.
This example is of course a simplistic representation of the argument
for patent protection. By guaranteeing an ex post monopoly to the
innovator, a patent can provide strong incentives for investment, in
particular, when the alternative is a perfectly competitive situation.
However, an in-depth discussion of patent policy is not the purpose
of this monograph. Instead, the example was constructed to make the
following trivial but general point:
Ex post competition: Any change in parameters that reduces the
ex post profits Π1 without having an effect on ex ante profits Π0 reduces
the value of innovation.
This point clearly holds even when ΠW1 is not the monopoly profit.
If we accept that, whatever an increase in the intensity of ex post
competition is, it results in a ceteris paribus reduction in ex post profits
of a successful innovator, then more intense ex post competition is
clearly bad for innovation.
2.2 Ex ante Market Structure
Following Arrow (1962), we now consider the other polar case: We
compare two environments which differ only according to the ex ante
situation (before the investment).
We now assume that the innovator always obtains the monopoly
profit corresponding to the post-innovation marginal costs ex post, that
is, Π1 = ΠM (∆). Ex ante, we first consider the case that the profit
under weak competition (ΠW0 ) is the monopoly profit for pre-innovation
costs ΠM (0), whereas, under intense competition, firms obtain perfect
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competition profits (ΠI0 = 0). The value of the innovation for the case
of weak ex ante competition is thus:
V W = Π1 − ΠW0 = ΠM (∆) − ΠM (0).
The value of the innovation for the case of intense ex ante compe-
tition is:
V I = Π1 − ΠI0 = ΠM (∆).
Thus, more intense ex ante competition increases innovation incen-
tives: Even though the ex post profits of firms are independent of
ex ante competition, the value of innovation is lower for the monopolist
because he earns higher profits if he abstains from innovation. This is
commonly known as the “replacement effect”: Contrary to the perfectly
competitive firm, the monopolist who innovates faces the opportunity
cost that, to some extent, his post-innovation profit replaces his positive
pre-innovation profit.
Again, the crucial point is more general:
Ex ante competition: Any change in parameters that reduces the
ex ante profits Π0 for any given realization of marginal costs without
having an effect on ex post profits Π1 increases the value of innovation.
2.3 Conclusion
Though these two examples are simple, they are useful to illustrate
several points.
First, the examples suggest that it is valuable to think of “increas-
ing competition” in terms of abstract properties: For instance, a move
from monopoly to perfect competition clearly has the property that the
per-firm profits fall. As we will see below, this property is shared by
several other parameter shifts which are usually considered as exam-
ples of increasing competition. Nevertheless, one would clearly hesitate
to use it as a defining property of an increase in competition. Other
parameter shifts that one would usually not associate with increases
in competition, such as increases in taxation, have the same property.
However, it is a typical implication of increasing competition that is
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useful to understand some aspects of the relation between competition
and innovation.
Property 1 of competition: An increase of competition has the
effect that it leads to lower gross profits per firm as long as firms are
sufficiently symmetric.2
Second, the examples help to identify a first simple reason for con-
fusion in the debate on competition and investment. One has to be
aware of the distinction between ex post and ex ante competition.
While an increase in ex post competition reduces innovation incentives,
an increase in ex ante competition increases them. As long as one is
clear about the distinction between ex post and ex ante competitions,
there is no contradiction between the Schumpeterian view that some
monopoly rents ex post are required for innovation and Arrow’s argu-
ment that competitive pressure ex ante is helpful to induce innovation.
Moreover, there may be circumstances where focusing exclusively on
the effects of either ex post or ex ante competition is adequate: For
instance, it is useful to think of an increase in appropriability of inno-
vations in terms of a reduction of ex post competition. Similarly, when
considering the effects of competition on the propensity to carry out
drastic innovations for which the ex post monopoly is guaranteed, it is
adequate to focus on changes in ex ante competition.
Nevertheless, many interesting questions about the relation between
competition and innovation concern simultaneous changes in the
intensity of ex ante and ex post competition. The above examples
immediately suggest that such changes may involve the presence of
two countervailing effects, providing a first idea of why general unam-
biguous results on such effects are hard to obtain.
2The restriction to “sufficiently symmetric” firms is necessary because, in suitable examples,
comparatively efficient firms may benefit from an increase in competition.
3
A Simple General Framework
“Increasing competition” usually refers to changes in the market envi-
ronment that make it harder (or even impossible) for firms to exercise
monopoly power. But this is still a very vague description of what
competition is. A closer look reveals many different possible interpre-
tations. Some of these interpretations relate to institutional changes,
such as stricter cartel laws, less stringent enforcement of intellectual
property rights, or less rigid entry regulation.
In other cases, the relation to the institutional environment is less
direct. For example, an increase in globalization is often associated
with increasing competition. In principle, globalization can be brought
about by changes that are independent of the regulatory environment
in a particular industry. For instance, stronger exposure to exports may
be the result of decreasing transportation costs. However, globalization
may also reflect changes in the legal environment: Increases in FDI may
be the result of liberalization; similarly increasing exports may result
from abolishing trade barriers.
In this section, I will introduce a general framework for analyzing
such changes in competition, which is a simplified version of Schmutzler
(2010). This framework will serve to organize many different examples.
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I will argue that standard parameterizations of competition have cer-
tain abstract properties which are useful to understand the effects of
competition on innovation.1
The analysis will uncover four intuitive transmission channels by
which competition affects innovation. It will transpire that, for most
examples, these four effects go into different directions. Moreover, the
sign of some of the effects depends on the particular example. There-
fore, it is unsurprising that competition has such ambiguous effects on
investment.
The following assumptions will be maintained unless stated other-
wise.
(A1) The decisions are taken by monopolists or duopolists.2
(A2) The firms take two decisions. First, they choose cost-reducing
investments (y1,y2). Then they choose quantities or prices in
the product market.
(A3) In the product market, each firm i obtains profits Πi (yi,yj ;θ)
that are increasing in their own previous investments yi and
decreasing in those of the competitor (yj) and also depend
on a parameter θ measuring the intensity of competition.3
(A4) The gross profit functions are symmetric: For a given level
of competition, own investments and competitor investments
fully determine gross profits; there are no firm-specific differ-
ences in the effects.
Most assumptions will be relaxed later on. For instance, I will con-
sider markets with more than two firms and endogenous entry decisions,
and I shall allow for initial asymmetries.
For simplicity, I will further assume that profits are a differentiable
function of yi. I refer to the partial derivative ∂Πi∂yi as the innovation
incentive. For duopoly games, is straightforward to see that, if an
1Boone (2000, 2001, 2008) also defines competition in such abstract terms, but the emphasis
of his analysis is more on justifying these properties rather than on applying them to the
issues we are interested in.
2Most of the general arguments work quite well with arbitrary number so firms.
3Obviously, when I refer to a monopoly, firm i has no competitor j, so Πi (yi,yj) simplifies
to Πi (yi).
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increase in the competition parameter increases the innovation incen-
tives for all investment levels, this parameter change shifts out the
reaction functions in (y1,y2)-space. While this does not automatically
imply that the equilibrium investment levels are higher, there are fairly
innocuous supplementary conditions guaranteeing the result.4 The fol-
lowing analysis therefore attempts to clarify what determines the rela-
tion between θ and the innovation incentive, assuming implicitly that
a positive effect of θ on the innovation incentives corresponds to a pos-
itive effect on investments.5
The analysis relies on the simple decomposition:
Πi(yi,yj ;θ) = Qi(yi,yj ;θ) · Mi(yi,yj ;θ), (3.1)
where Qi(yi,yj ;θ) is the equilibrium output, and Mi(yi,yj ;θ) is the
equilibrium margin. Applying the product rule to Equation (3.1), we
obtain the following useful expression for the innovation incentive:
∂Πi
∂yi
= Mi
∂Qi
∂yi
+ Qi
∂Mi
∂yi
. (3.2)
The term identifies two reasons why innovation is good for firms’
gross profits.
First, investment typically increases equilibrium output. The mech-
anism is the following: A firm with lower marginal costs typically has
a lower equilibrium price. This usually results in higher equilibrium
output.6 The strength of the positive profit effect Mi ∂Qi∂yi induced by
this output increase obviously depends positively on the size of the
profit margin Mi.
Second, investment typically increases equilibrium margins Mi =
pi − ci, reflecting the lower marginal costs ci.7 The strength of the
4See Schmutzler (2010) for details. For instance, I identify strategic complementarity
between investments and symmetry as alternative sufficient conditions. I also give condi-
tions under which an increase in the number of firms that involves a reduction in marginal
innovation incentives leads to a reduction in the symmetric equilibrium.
5 It is important to note that, in general, the innovation incentive is a function of investment
levels, so that, in particular, the effects of competition on innovation incentives may depend
on the level of previous investments.
6However, there can be a countervailing effect that the competitor also reacts to lower
costs by reducing prices. In standard models, the own effect dominates over the cross-
effect, however.
7Again, a countervailing effect needs to be considered. When a firm has lower costs, it
will pass the efficiency gains on in the form of lower equilibrium prices, which leads to a
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positive profit effect Qi ∂Mi∂yi induced by this margin increase obviously
depends positively on the size of the output Qi.
Understanding the effects of competition on innovation incentives
thus reduces to understanding how θ affects each of the terms in Equa-
tion (3.2). To this end, I now consider several examples.
reduction in the margin. In all the above examples and in most other familiar settings,
however, the direct effect dominates, so that ∂Mi
∂yi
> 0.
4
Learning from Examples
I will now introduce simple examples to illustrate the effects of compe-
tition on investment in different contexts (Section 4.1). In Section 4.2,
I will discuss what we can learn from the examples.
4.1 The Examples
I shall consider the following examples of increasing competition:
(i) Less restrictive entry regulation
(ii) Increasing substitutability of products
(iii) Market integration
All three changes can be regarded as instances of increasing compe-
tition, as they make it more difficult (or even impossible) for firms
to behave in a monopolistic fashion. Even so, the effects on cost-
reducing investments will turn out to be very different in the three
cases. (i) Allowing entry of a second firm into a previously monopolis-
tic market reduces innovation incentives. (ii) Increasing substitutability
of products has a more complex effect, which depends on the details of
the situation. As an illustration, I will provide an example where there
370
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is a U-shaped relation: Starting from complete differentiation where
each firm is a monopolist, increasing substitutability lowers invest-
ments; once a certain threshold has been reached, investments increase
as substitutability is increased even further. (iii) Integration of markets
increases innovation incentives.
4.1.1 Entry Liberalization
In the 1980s and 1990s, entry has been liberalized in many markets
across the world. Monopolists in many industries are now exposed
to competition from entrants. While a full model of the effects of
entry liberalization on investments must take the asymmetries between
incumbent and entrants seriously, as a first approximation we compare
investment decisions of a monopolist with those of duopolists with the
same technology as the monopolist.
More precisely, suppose that market demand is given by a simple
linear function x = 1 − p. Before deciding on their outputs, firms can
reduce their marginal costs from a common level C ∈ (0,1) to a new
level:
ci = C − yi. (4.1)
Though the qualitative insights do not depend on this particular spec-
ification, suppose the necessary R&D-investment costs are K(yi) = y2i .
Monopoly In the original monopoly situation, the price of the
monopolistic firm 1 is:
p1 =
1 + c1
2
=
1 + C − y1
2
.
The resulting output is thus:
Q1 = 1 − 1 + C − y12 =
1 − C + y1
2
. (4.2)
The profit margin is:
M1 = p1 − c1 = 1 − C + y12 . (4.3)
Both Equations (4.2) and (4.3) are very intuitive: Cost reductions
translate into higher outputs and profit margins. More precisely, note
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the effect of the cost reduction on the profit margin: If prices were
unchanged after a cost reduction, it would translate one-to-one into an
increase in margins. However, prices adjust downwards, so that only
half of the cost reduction shows up as a margin increase.
The two results immediately imply that the firm obtains gross
profits:
Π1 = M1 · Q1 =
(
1 − C + y1
2
)2
. (4.4)
When the firm chooses its investment, it anticipates this relation
between investments and gross profits. It chooses investments so as to
maximize net profits Πi − K(yi). First-order conditions are therefore,
∂
∂y1
((
1 − C + y1
2
)2
− (y1)2
)
=
1 − C + y1
2
− 2y1 = 0. (4.5)
The resulting optimal investment of the monopolist is:
y∗1 =
1 − C
3
. (4.6)
Duopoly Next, we move to a case of comparatively intense compe-
tition. Suppose there are two firms which act as Cournot competi-
tors. Thus, we are considering a two-stage game where firms first
simultaneously choose cost-reducing investments, then outputs.
Therefore, for any pair of investment decisions (y1,y2) with cor-
responding marginal cost levels (c1, c2), the Cournot outcome results.
Standard textbook analysis shows how the equilibrium output Qi and
price pi depend on marginal costs: It is simple to show that:
Qi = Mi =
(1 − 2ci + cj)
3
. (4.7)
These results are intuitive: A firm that becomes more efficient puts
more output on the market, hence driving down equilibrium prices of
both firms. If the competitor j becomes more efficient, he expands his
output, which leads to a reduction of the market price. As a conse-
quence, firm i’s output declines.
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Using Equation (4.1), Equation (4.7) immediately gives the relation
between investments and output and margins, respectively, as:
Qi = Mi =
(1 − C + 2yi − yj)
3
. (4.8)
Thus, gross profits Πi = Mi · Qi in equilibrium are:
Πi =
(1 − C + 2yi − yj)2
9
. (4.9)
Now consider first-period investment decisions, still assuming that
investment costs are K(yi) = y2i . Firms who anticipate that profits will
behave according to Equation (4.9) thus choose investments so as to
maximize:
πi =
(1 − C + 2yi − yj)2
9
− y2i .
Profit maximization thus leads to first-order conditions:
∂
∂yi
(
(1 − C + 2yi − yj)2
9
− y2i
)
=
8yi − 4C − 4yj + 4
9
− 2yi = 0.
This immediately results in a symmetric equilibrium:
y =
2(1 − C)
7
. (4.10)
Comparison and Interpretation By comparing Equations (4.6)
and (4.10), we obtain:
Summary: An increase in the number of firms leads to a reduction
in per-firm investments and hence to higher marginal costs.
Differentiation of Equations (4.4) and (4.9) shows a negative effect of
competition on innovation incentives. Whereas they are ∂Π∂y1 =
1−C+y1
2
in the monopoly case, they are only ∂Π∂yi =
4
9(1 − C + yi) in the duopoly
case for symmetric firms.
Decomposition (Equation (3.2)) shows the economic intuition quite
clearly: In the monopoly case, we obtained:
Q1 = M1 =
1 − C + y1
2
. (4.11)
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In the Cournot case,
Mi = Qi =
(1 − C + 2yi − yj)
3
. (4.12)
Thus, competition (entry liberalization) reduces both outputs and
margins when yi = yj . Because competition reduces margins, it makes
any output expansion of size ∂Qi∂yi less attractive. Similarly, by reduc-
ing output, competition makes any margin expansion of size ∂Mi∂yi
less attractive. While these negative level effects of competition work
against innovation, the positive effects on ∂Qi∂yi and
∂Mi
∂yi
work in favor
of it. Thus, the extent of output expansion induced by any given cost
reduction becomes larger as competition increases; it is 2/3 for the
duopoly, as opposed to 1/2 for the monopoly. Similarly, the size of the
margin expansion induced by any given cost reduction becomes larger
as competition increases.
Summary: Entry liberalization reduces the innovation incentives
of each firm. As a result, the industry cost level is higher. The result
reflects the dominance of the negative effects of competition on outputs
and margins over the positive effects on ∂Qi∂yi and
∂Mi
∂yi
.
4.1.2 Increasing Substitutability
One of the most common interpretations of increasing competition
concerns increases in the degree of substitutability between products:
As products become closer substitutes, competition becomes more
intense.1
Many models of differentiated oligopoly are available. Follow-
ing Singh and Vives (1984), for example, suppose both firms have
inverse demands:
pi(qi, qj) = 1 − qi − θqj , (4.13)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. The corresponding demand functions are increasing
in the price of the competitor; thus the goods are substitutes. For
1See for instance Vives (2008) for a general treatment of the relation between substitutabil-
ity and innovation incentives.
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θ = 0, firms are monopolists; θ = 1 corresponds to homogeneous goods.2
Higher θ corresponds to better substitutability. It is simple, but tedious,
to calculate outputs and margins as3
Qi(yi,yj) = Mi(yi,yj) =
2(a − C + yi) − θ(a − C + yj)
4 − θ2 , i = j.
(4.14)
Thus gross profits are:
Πi(yi,yj) =
(
2(a − C + yi) − θ(a − C + yj)
4 − θ2
)2
, i = j. (4.15)
Using this expression and assuming investment costs K(yi) = y2i , one
can easily derive investments in the symmetric equilibrium where
y1 = y2. The middle line in Figure 4.1 plots these investments for initial
cost levels C = 0.5. The line is U-shaped: Starting from a monopoly,
an increase in competition first reduces investment; beyond θ = 2/3
further increases lead to higher investments.
It is potentially fruitful to think of θ as a crude representation of
intellectual property law (patent breadth). Strict intellectual property
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yi
Fig. 4.1 Differentiated Cournot competition.
2Essentially, therefore, the example extends the entry example to intermediate levels of
competition.
3The results are taken from Sacco and Schmutzler (2010), which also contains experimental
evidence for the U-shape in an otherwise identical example with other parameters.
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law (low θ) means that the entrant is forced to choose a good that
is highly differentiated from the one produced by the patentholder.
Even though, for sufficiently symmetric firms, gross profits increase
as θ decreases (competition gets softer), achieving more differentiation
may involve greater costs; as entrants need to “invent around” the
patented good to enter the market. If the costs of further differentia-
tion outweigh the benefits, entrants will voluntarily choose the maximal
allowed value of θ. Though the main point of this example is to illus-
trate the possibility of non-monotone effects of increasing competition,
it also suggests a policy issue that is worthy of further investigation:
Intellectual property rights on new products not only influence the
incentive to carry out product innovations. They may also have impli-
cations for process innovations: By influencing the degree of product
differentiation between the patentholder and his competitors, they also
influence the willingness of firms to invest in cost reductions.
Summary: In the product differentiation example with quantity
competition and inverse demand (4.13), the effect of an increase in
substitutability on cost-reducing investments is negative for low initial
values of competition, positive for higher values.
Interpretation Innovation incentives can be obtained by differenti-
ation of gross profits (Equation (4.15)). It is simple to show that, for
symmetric firms, this leads to innovation incentives that have a U-shape
as a function of θ.4
To understand the sources of this U-shape better, it is helpful to
consider Equation (4.14). The expression shows that ∂Q
i
∂θ =
∂M i
∂θ < 0,
so that output and margin effects are negative. As ∂
2Qi
∂yi∂θ
= ∂
2M i
∂yi∂θ
> 0,
the remaining effects are positive: An increase in θ corresponds to an
increase in ∂Qi∂yi and
∂Mi
∂yi
. Hence, the U-shaped relation between compe-
tition and investment reflects the interplay between the negative effect
of competition on output and margin and the positive effect on ∂Qi∂yi and
∂Mi
∂yi
: Starting from low competition, greater competition, by reducing
outputs and margins, reduces incentives to increase efficiency. Beyond
4Sacco and Schmutzler (2010) show this, and they also provide some experimental evidence
for the claims.
4.1 The Examples 377
a certain threshold, however, the effect of competition on investment is
positive, reflecting the positive output sensitivity and margin effects.
Modifications A cautionary remark on the U-shape obtained here is
in order: The effects of strengthening competition by increasing substi-
tutability depend substantially on the exact model of product differen-
tiation. For instance, with the above demand system and price rather
than quantity competition, the effects of stricter competition are nega-
tive. This is driven by the fact that, with price competition, ∂
2M i
∂yi∂θ
< 0,
because investments trigger lower competitor prices. Also, alternative
demand systems are often considered. For instance, consider
pi(qi, qj ;θ) = 1 − 11 + θ qi −
θ
1 + θ
qj , (4.16)
where θ ∈ [0,1]. Contrary to Equation (4.13), this function does not
have the property that an increase in θ shifts overall demand inwards.
This difference leads to a strictly positive effect of more intense com-
petition on investment for both output and price competition.5 It is
precisely this kind of sensitivity of results to details of the model that
motivates this monograph.
The most complete analysis of the effects of greater substitutability
on innovation incentives is Vives (2008). Apart from a general analysis,
he also provides a large number of examples, including some of those
mentioned above as well as the Salop model of competition on the cir-
cle, models with constant elasticity demand, and constant expenditure
models. The reader is referred to this rich collection of examples for
further information on the effects of substitutability on investments.6
4.1.3 Market Integration
Suppose initially there are two identical countries, each served by a local
monopolist as described above, with demand function D(p) = 1 − p.
5For a slightly more detailed treatment, see Schmutzler (2010).
6However, Vives only considers the case of symmetric firms. In Schmutzler (2010), I show
how some of the standard examples have to be modified in the presence of asymmetric
firms. The examples show that the picture obtained from the symmetric case can be
misleading: For instance, in a Hotelling duopoly a reduction in transportation costs has
no effect on investments for symmetric firms, whereas there are positive effects for leaders
and negative effects for laggards.
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Suppose then that perfect integration of markets takes place, so that
each firm can serve both markets without incurring transportation
costs. Thus, there is one world market with total demand function
D(p) = 2(1 − p). Assume for the moment that both firms continue to
serve the integrated market. Then the new market is a Cournot duopoly
with larger total demand than before. Hence, we can think of this sim-
plistic model of market integration as a combination of the entry lib-
eralization model with a doubling of demand.
Thus, pre-integration outputs, margins, and gross profits are given
by Equations (4.2)–(4.4), resulting as before in equilibrium investments:
y∗1 =
1 − C
3
.
Post-integration outputs and margins can easily be seen to be:
Qi =
2(1 − C + 2yi − yj)
3
and Mi =
(1 − C + 2yi − yj)
3
.
Thus, gross profits Πi = Mi · Qi in equilibrium are:
Πi =
2(1 − C + 2yi − yj)2
9
. (4.17)
Simple calculations lead to a symmetric equilibrium:
y =
4(1 − C)
5
. (4.18)
Thus, in spite of the superficial similarity with the entry liberaliza-
tion example, the opposite result holds.
Summary: Integration of two monopolistic markets leads to an
increase in per-firm investments.
Interpretation It is straightforward to see from Equations (4.4)
and (4.17) that innovation incentives after integration are higher than
before integration. Outputs and profit margins before integration cor-
respond to those of the monopoly case,
Q1 = M1 =
1 − C + y1
2
.
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With open markets, the corresponding quantities for the duopolists
become:
Qi =
2(1 − C + 2yi − yj)
3
and Mi =
1 − C + 2yi − yj
3
. (4.19)
Thus, the effect of integration on margins Mi is negative, but the
positive effect on Qi, ∂Mi∂yi and
∂Qi
∂yi
dominates.
4.1.4 Summary and Outlook
So far, our analysis has shown that the effects of competition on cost-
reducing investments depend heavily on the precise way in which com-
petition is increased.
1. Entry liberalization leads to lower investments.
2. The effects of decreasing product differentiation are more
subtle. In the case of quantity competition with inverse
demand Equation (4.13), the effect is U-shaped, but depend-
ing on the details of oligopolistic competition, other results
will obtain.
3. Integration of monopolistic markets leads to larger invest-
ments.
These observations are in need of explanation. In all the examples
under consideration, increasing competition refers to changes in the
economic environment, which make monopolistic pricing more likely.
Why do these changes have such different effects even so?
4.2 General Lessons
Summing up, what have we learnt from the examples? Quite generally,
Equation (3.2) helps to identify the four channels by which competi-
tion affects investment. Roughly speaking, each transmission channel
corresponds to the effects of competition on one of the four terms on
the right-hand side. To understand each transmission channel, we must
understand how each of the terms Mi, Qi, ∂Mi∂yi , and
∂Qi
∂yi
depends on
competition.
Table 4.1 summarizes the effects of competition on the variables of
interest.
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Table 4.1. Six Symmetric and Four Asymmetric Sessions
Qi Mi
∂Qi
∂yi
∂Mi
∂yi
∂Πi
∂yi
Entry − − + + −
Differentiation (quantity) − − + + ∪
Differentiation (price) + − + − −
Integration + − + + +
4.2.1 The Transmission Channels
I will now address each of the four transmission channels individually.
In doing so, I will identify further properties that competition typically
has.
Margins All examples have one thing in common: Profit margins Mi
are decreasing in competition for given investment levels. Everything
else would have been a surprise: It is a defining feature of standard
notions of competition that they correspond to greater pressure on
margins.7 We thus will frequently invoke the following.
Property 2 of Competition: An increase of competition leads to
lower margins for arbitrary symmetric cost levels.
The main implication is immediate: Because profit margins Mi are
decreasing in competition, an output increase ∂Qi∂yi of any given size
resulting from investment leads to a smaller profit increase Mi ∂Qi∂yi when
competition is intense. We call this the negative margin effect of com-
petition on innovation incentives.
Output The effects of competition on output Qi differ across exam-
ples. Clearly, there is an obvious reason why the effect should be pos-
itive: The downward pressure of competition on a firm’s own prices
should result in an expansion of own output (which is dampened by
the simultaneous reduction of the competitor’s price). Even so, we only
observe a positive effect of competition on the equilibrium output of
each firm in the integration example. In the entry example and the
product differentiation example with inverse demand Equation (4.13),
equilibrium output falls as competition increases. The reasons are
7Boone (2008) points out counterexamples, however.
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slightly different in these two examples. In the entry case, the result
comes from the fact that output is split across two firms rather than
produced by one. Thus, in spite of the lower prices (which correspond
to a higher market output), output per firm is lower when competi-
tion increases. In the product differentiation case, the negative effect
of closer substitutes reflects a direct (not price-induced) negative effect
on the parameter increase on outputs.
Summing up, the effect of competition on output is ambiguous.
Thus, so is the output effect of competition on innovation incentives.
Whenever competition has a positive effect on Qi, it increases the value
Qi
∂Mi
∂yi
of any margin increase ∂Mi∂yi brought about by investment; other
things equal, this increases the investment incentive. The converse argu-
ment applies when competition has a negative effect on Qi.
Cost-pass-through Competition affects the extent to which effi-
ciency gains are passed on to customers via lower prices. From
the definition of profit margins, Mi = pi − ci = pi − C + yi, it follows
immediately that ∂Mi∂yi =
∂pi
∂yi
+ 1, so that competition has a positive
effect on ∂Mi∂yi if and only if it reduces |
∂pi
∂yi
|, that is, if it reduces the
extent to which efficiency gains are passed on as lower prices.
The examples show that competition may lead to more or less
cost-pass-through: For entry liberalization, integration and differenti-
ation with quantity competition and inverse demand given by Equa-
tion (4.13), competition always has a positive effect on ∂Mi∂yi , reflecting a
reduction in pass-through. However, the opposite effect is also observed
in some cases. For instance, in the differentiation example with price
rather than quantity competition, the effect is negative. Hence, the cost-
pass-through effect of competition is also ambiguous: When competi-
tion increases ∂Mi∂yi , then, everything else equal, this will also increase
the effects on Qi ∂Mi∂yi , the part of Equation (3.2) that reflects the effect
of a higher margin; conversely, when competition reduces ∂Mi∂yi .
Output Sensitivity Finally, consider the effects of competition on
the sensitivity of output with respect to efficiency, ∂Qi∂yi . In all examples,
this effect is positive. Intuitively, this reflects that the demand-stealing
property of greater efficiency becomes more important as competition
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increases. Or, as Syverson (2004, p. 1187) puts it,
“Markets with greater substitutability are more
competitive in the sense that their higher cross-price
elasticities more greatly reward (punish) relatively
low(high)-cost producers in terms of market share.”
We therefore state the following property of competition:
Property 3: An increase in competition leads to an increase in the
sensitivity of output with respect to investment, ∂Qi∂yi .
Thus, in the following, we shall assume that the output-sensitivity
effect of competition on investment is positive: As θ increases, the sen-
sitivity of output with respect to efficiency (∂Qi∂yi ) increases. Everything
else equal, this will also increase the effects of competition on Mi ∂Qi∂yi ,
the part of Equation (3.2) that reflects the profit increase induced by
investment that comes from a higher output.
Summary Of the four transmission channels identified for the gen-
eral framework, the margin effect is always negative. The output-
sensitivity effect is positive. The output and cost-pass-through effect
are ambiguous. Therefore, it is unsurprising that competition has no
robust effect on investment, not even in the simple framework identified
here.
4.2.2 Further Examples: Cournot versus Bertrand
The general framework contains many examples that have been treated
in the literature. For instance, the distinction between Cournot and
Bertrand competition has also received a lot of attention in the inno-
vation literature. The intuition for treating a shift from Cournot to
Bertrand as an increase in competition is that price competition tends
to drive down prices, and thereby margins and gross profits. Thus,
Properties 1 and 2 typically hold. In itself, this would suggest a nega-
tive effect of competition on investment. On the other hand, the lower
prices typically also imply a higher equilibrium output. Also, consistent
with Property 3, however, a shift from Cournot to Bertrand competi-
tion typically increases the positive output effect of higher efficiency.
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Together, these last two forces work toward a positive effect of com-
petition on innovation incentives. These forces already suggest that
the aggregate effect of shifting from Bertrand to Cournot may not
be entirely clear-cut. In the existing literature, this problem is com-
pounded by additional modeling differences. I will briefly review several
contributions.
Delbono and Denicolo` (1990) considered the case of homogeneous
products in a setting where the investment stage is modeled as a
stochastic patent race where firms continuously exert an effort to find
a cost-reducing innovation. They show that innovation incentives are
higher for Cournot competition than for Bertrand competition. Bester
and Petrakis (1993) showed that the result of Delbono and Denicolo
extends to the case of low product differentiation.8 As product differ-
entiation becomes sufficiently large, however, the ranking changes, and
incentives are higher for Bertrand competition. However, as argued by
Qiu (1997), Bester and Petrakis considered the innovation incentives in
a situation where only one firm has investment opportunities. He shows
that in a symmetric equilibrium of the corresponding investment game,
there is more R&D in the Cournot case than in the Bertrand case. The
result also holds with positive spillovers.9
Bonanno and Haworth (1998) show that, in a model of vertical
product differentiation a` la Mussa and Rosen (1978), incentives for
cost reductions are higher under quantity competition than under
price competition. This reflects familiar strategic effects. For Cournot
competition, innovation incentives are strengthened by the strategic
consideration that they induce desirable actions of the competitor
(quantity reductions), whereas they are weakened under Bertrand com-
petition, because they induce undesirable actions (price reductions).
In the terminology of Section 3, the cost-pass-through effect of moving
from Cournot to Bertrand competition is negative.
8They do not explicitly deal with a patent race; instead, they directly compare the incre-
mental profit increase from an innovation for price and quantity competition.
9Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) show that Qiu’s result can be reversed when spillovers
are endogenized.
5
Asymmetric Firms
So far, we have assumed that there are no initial cost differences
between firms. However, as a result of historical circumstances or past
investment decisions, initial asymmetries may well be relevant. There
are several reasons to deal with such asymmetries between leaders who
have low marginal costs Ci before the investment decisions are taken,
and laggards who have comparatively high marginal costs.
First, while it may make perfect sense to cast a purely theoretical
analysis in terms of symmetric firms, empirical work must deal with
the obvious fact that firms may be asymmetric.
Second, it is interesting to see how the effects of competition on
investments differ for leaders and laggards. This is a first step toward
identifying circumstances fostering a positive effect of competition on
investment.
Third, even for a fixed degree of competition, an interesting ques-
tion arises: Do leaders invest more than laggards? This question lies at
the heart of important policy issues. For instance, a large part of com-
petition policy is motivated by worries that market dominance might
have a tendency to be self-reinforcing. Though this is not necessar-
ily implied by larger investments of leaders, it is clear that, if larger
firms with lower marginal cost invest more than small firms with high
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marginal costs, this should at least work in the direction of increasing
market shares of leaders.1 We start with this issue.
5.1 Increasing Dominance
A large literature deals with the differences in the investments of lead-
ers and laggards. A major goal of this literature is to understand the
circumstances under which the investment decisions of firms lead to
endogenous monopolization.
Several authors have provided reasons why endogenous monopoliza-
tion might arise. Flaherty (1980) does so in the context of cost-reducing
investments; similarly Budd et al. (1993). Beggs and Klemperer (1992),
Cabral and Riordan (1994), and Cabral (forthcoming) do not treat
cost-reducing investments directly; instead they are concerned with
similar issues in the context of switching costs, learning-by-doing and
network effects.2
Athey and Schmutzler (2001) provide a general approach that
encompasses explicit investments into cost reduction or other improve-
ments of the state of the firm, but can also be used to address
“investments” that take the form of aggressive pricing (to obtain loyal
customers in the presence of switching costs) or producing high out-
puts to benefit from learning-by-doing or network effects. They provide
several general conditions for “weak increasing dominance” to emerge,
that is, for firms with low marginal costs to invest more than their
competitors. The authors consider the Markov-perfect equilibrium of a
dynamic model, but two of the countervailing forces can be identified
even in a simple static version of a cost-reduction model.
The most obvious reason why weak increasing dominance might not
hold is that firms that already have low initial marginal costs typically
require higher investment efforts to reduce marginal costs further: A
laggard may just have to take an existing technology from “off the
1For some clarifying ideas on this issue, consider the discussion of weak increasing domi-
nance versus strong increasing dominance in Athey and Schmutzler (2001).
2Cabral (2001) analyzes the potential for self-reinforcing dominance in a situation where
firms take different types of investments. Aydemir and Schmutzler (2008) show under
which circumstances increasing dominance can arise in a setting where large firms can
take over small firms, whereas small firms can enter.
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shelf”, whereas a leader might have to carry out cutting-edge research
to reduce costs further.3
Even though marginal investment costs should typically be higher
for leaders, weak increasing dominance may well arise because the
marginal benefits are also higher. To see this, it is helpful to recon-
sider Equation (3.2), which, to repeat, says that:
∂Πi
∂yi
= Mi
∂Qi
∂yi
+ Qi
∂Mi
∂yi
.
Now suppose that firms differ in their initial marginal costs Ci.
Then, the higher a firm’s initial efficiency level, the higher is its ini-
tial profit margin Mi. Therefore, the higher is the value of an output
increase of any given size ∂Qi∂yi . Similarly, the higher a firm’s initial effi-
ciency level, the higher is its initial equilibrium output Qi. Therefore,
the higher is the value of a margin increase of any given size ∂Mi∂yi .
Thus, there are clear complementarities between having high outputs
and high margins. These complementarities provide leaders with higher
incentives to increase their efficiency than laggards.4
In a general setting that allows for these countervailing effects,
Athey and Schmutzler (2001) provide conditions under which weak
increasing dominance arises.5 The conditions address both the case that
investments are strategic substitutes and that they are strategic com-
plements. The former case is more common; at least when spillovers are
weak, investments are typically strategic substitutes.6 Again, decompo-
sition Equation (3.2) is helpful to obtain the intuition. To understand
the effects of competitor investments (higher yj) on innovation incen-
tives Mi ∂Qi∂yi + Qi
∂Mi
∂yi
, consider the effects on the individual terms. Cru-
cially, as the competitors marginal costs fall, so do own margins Mi and
outputs Qi. This reduces the value of any output increase of given size
3This can be captured by allowing for investment cost functions of the form K(Ci,yi)
(where marginal investment costs are increasing in Ci) rather than just K(yi).
4However, even if one abstracts from the issue that the costs of becoming more efficient
may be higher for leaders than for laggards, there may still be countervailing effects: Even
though for standard linear models ∂Qi
∂yi
and ∂Mi
∂yi
are both independent of the initial effi-
ciency levels, this need not be the case for more general demand functions. If at least one
of the two terms is strongly concave, investment incentives could be lower for firms with
low marginal costs.
5They also provide such conditions for the dynamic case where additional countervailing
effects arise.
6This point goes back to Bagwell and Staiger (1994).
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∂Qi
∂yi
and the value of any margin increase of size ∂Mi∂yi . This is why the
investments are often strategic substitutes, no matter whether there is
price or quantity competition in the output market.7,8
For the static case, Figure 4.1 illustrates the occurrence of weak
increasing dominance for the particular product differentiation example
given there. Leaders invest more than laggards.9 This behavior reflects
the “output-margin complementarities” just described, together with
the simple investment cost function K(yi) = y2i , that rules out the real-
istic possibility that laggards have lower investment costs than leaders.
5.2 The Effects of Competition with Asymmetric Firms
Summing up, the increasing dominance literature identifies reasons why
leaders might invest more than laggards for any given level of competi-
tion. Essentially, whether weak increasing dominance arises depends on
the relative strength of the output-margin complementarities and the
investment cost advantage of laggards. I now move to the role which
competition plays in this respect. Does competition make it more likely
that increasing dominance arises? Another way of phrasing this is: Does
competition tend to have a more positive effect on the innovation incen-
tives of leaders or on those of laggards?
In many examples, it is indeed true that competition is more likely
to have a positive effect on the innovation incentives of leaders than on
those of laggards. More precisely, if competition has a positive effect
on the investments of laggards, it usually also has a positive effect
on the investments of leaders. An illustration is again provided by
Figure 4.1, which refers to Cournot competition with demand functions
7 In principle, both ∂Qi
∂yi
and ∂Mi
∂yi
could depend positively on the competitor’s marginal
costs, thereby working against increasing dominance. In standard linear models, there is
no such effect.
8 Interestingly, a well-known paper of Gilbert and Newbery (1982) which argues in favor
of a negative effect of competition and investment, uses a special case of the strategic
property. The authors compare the investment incentive of a monopolist with marginal
costs M threatened by entry with those of the entrant. They argue that the monopolist has
stronger incentives to reduce costs to L, essentially because a successful duopolist will still
have to live with the competition of the monopolist. Technically, πi(L,H) − πi(M,H) ≥
πi(L,M) − πi(M,M), where H corresponds to a cost level that is so high that πi(M,H)
is the monopoly profit. Clearly, this is a strategic substitutes property for the relevant cost
levels.
9Laggards have initial marginal costs of 0.7; leaders have initial marginal costs of 0.3.
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as in Equation (4.13). As in the case of symmetric firms, the invest-
ments of leaders are a U-shaped function of θ. However, the upward-
sloping part of the curve starts earlier than for symmetric firms. The
investments of laggards decline as competition grows. Thus, competi-
tion tends to have a more positive effect on the investments of leaders
than on those of laggards. Similar observations can be made for many
other duopoly models, including the Hotelling Model, price competi-
tion with demand function (Equation (4.13)) and price and quantity
competition with demand function (Equation (4.16)); see Schmutzler
(2010).10 There I also use the decomposition (Equation (3.2)) to explain
why the observation that competition tends to have a more negative
effect on laggards than on leaders is not a coincidence.
The key intuition is that the only one of the four effects outlined in
Section 4.2 that is robustly positive, the output-sensitivity effect, tends
to zero for firms that lag strongly behind their competitors. Intuitively,
because such firms have small margins M i, the positive effect of compe-
tition on the increase of output resulting from an increase in efficiency
does not translate into a strong positive effect on the increase in the
corresponding value of this output. Also, the output effect is more likely
to be positive when a firm is efficient: Because of Property 3, there is
a complementarity between increasing competition and increasing effi-
ciency in increasing equilibrium output.
The analysis of this section suggests an interesting conclusion. When
designing institutions to foster competition, policy faces an important
tradeoff. Institutions that are good for competition in the short term
(in the sense that they tend to reduce margins) may foster the destruc-
tion of competition in the long run, because they strengthen the ten-
dency for markets toward self-reinforcing dominance. As this long-term
destruction of competition results from greater efficiency of the leaders,
the net welfare effects are non-obvious.
10Contrary to the weak increasing dominance result that leaders invest more than laggards,
these observations are unrelated to the fact that the investment costs are independent
of initial marginal costs Ci: As long as there is no effect of the competition parameter
on marginal investment costs, the entire effect of competition on investments must come
from the gross profit term.
6
Extensions
Even though the above analysis was general with respect to the nature
of product market interaction and the underlying notion of competi-
tion, it was oversimplified in several other respects. In the following,
I therefore introduce a number of extensions. I will discuss endogenous
market participation, separation of ownership and control, and prod-
uct innovations. I will also deal with extensions to a growth-theoretic
framework.
Some of these extensions have received considerable attention in
the literature. However, the modeling approaches often differ from the
basic model in more than one dimension. The economic intuition for
the change in the effects of competition on investment is therefore not
immediate. I will therefore explain in each case what the source of
variation with respect to the basic model is.
6.1 Endogenous Entry
Building from ideas introduced by Sutton (1991, 1998), authors such
as Raith (2003)) and Vives (2008) have modified oligopoly models of
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innovation as above so as to allow for entry decisions of firms.1 To
illustrate the essence of the approach, suppose firms incur a fixed cost
of market participation. Suppose further that the decision to enter
the market has to be taken before the investment decision, with an
investment game as described before. To understand how increases in
competition parameters such as the substitutability of goods affect
cost-reducing investments, note that the following results hold quite
generally.
First, consider the investment subgame. In many examples, the
investments of each firm will be decreasing in the number of firms
in the market, at least when firms are not too asymmetric.2 This is
a generalization of the earlier entry liberalization example. Intuitively,
firms expect lower margins and lower outputs when there are more
competitors. This makes investments less attractive.3
Second, according to Property 1, an increase in the intensity of
competition for any given number of firms will tend to reduce gross
profits. Hence, the number of firms that can survive in the market falls
as competition increase. Taking into account that a lower number of
firms increase innovation incentives, ignoring the effects of competition
on market participation biases the effects of competition on innovation
downwards.
We shall return to the issue of endogenous market participation at
the end of the next section, when we discuss the model of Raith (2003),
who incorporates both endogenous entry and separation of ownership
and control. In the meantime, we deal with the latter issue in isolation.
6.2 Separation of Ownership and Control
The statement of Hicks (1935), according to which “the best of
all monopoly profits is a quiet life” suggests that positive effects
of competition on innovation might be particularly relevant when
1Raith (2003) also allows for separation of ownership and control, see Section 6.2.
2Figure 4.1 already shows that the statement is not necessary true for asymmetric firms:
For θ = 0 (monopoly), the investments of a leader are lower than for θ = 1 (homogeneous
firm duopoly).
3The effects of the number of firms on cost-pass through and output sensitivity of invest-
ments are less obvious, but nevertheless the overall effect is negative in most examples.
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managerial efforts are required. The preceding analysis has already
shown that positive effects may well arise even for owner-controlled
firms. A number of authors (e.g., Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt, 1997; Raith,
2003) have introduced separation of ownership and control. Typically,
these authors consider the effects of competition on the efforts of
chief executives to engage in cost-reducing activities.4 Even though
the details depend on how agency conflicts are introduced, the general
message is that, with separation of ownership and control, the effects
of competition on process innovations tend to be more positive. In the
following, I briefly review some of the main contributions.
6.2.1 The Threat of Liquidation (Schmidt, 1997)
Schmidt (1997) introduces a simple reduced-form model in which a
principal (the firm) chooses an incentive contract for an agent (the
manager). The contract is designed to induce the optimal effort level
from the manager, taking into account his incentive, participation, and
wealth constraints. Together with a probabilistic state of the world,
efforts determine the firm’s cost level. The firm’s profit depends on cost
and an exogenous parameter, the level of competition. Hence, there is
no modeling of the interaction between different firms; a firm’s com-
petitor only shows up indirectly in the competition parameter.5 The
profit depends negatively on costs and (in line with Property 1) on
the competition parameter. Moreover, with some probability the firm
will get liquidated. The liquidation probability depends negatively on
managerial efforts.
The agent’s preferences are standard in that they depend positively
on monetary rewards and negatively on efforts. An important twist is
that the manager dislikes liquidation. The simplest interpretation is
that he loses his job, which is costly for him.
Under some technical conditions, the constrained optimization
problem of the owner can be shown to be equivalent to an unconstrained
optimization problem where he maximizes expected gross profits minus
4An interesting related paper by Theilen (2009) deals with the effects of competition on
the efforts of lower tier employees.
5The model can be adjusted to fit into an oligopolistic framework (see Schmutzler, 2010).
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the costs of inducing effort (which factor in the managerial constraints).
This looks very similar to the benchmark model of Section 3, but there
is one important exception: Contrary to the investment costs of Sec-
tion 3, the costs required to induce managerial effort depend on the
intensity of competition: As competition increases, so does the proba-
bility of liquidation. As the manager dislikes liquidation, this provides
him with incentives to avoid liquidation by inducing effort. So start-
ing from a reference case of a profit-maximizing owner-managed firm,
the separation of ownership and control introduces a reason why com-
petition might induce stronger incentives for investment than in the
reference case.
The main result that Schmidt himself highlights is slightly different.
He emphasizes that the relation between competition and innovation
has an inverse U-shape. In view of the above considerations, it would
appear that this specific prediction of the model results from a partic-
ular aspect of the underlying competitive environment that implicitly
rules out some of the models discussed above. In particular, any model
that predicts a monotone positive relation between competition and
innovation in owner-managed firms should predict a strictly monotone
relation with separation of ownership and control.
Summary: By reducing the costs of inducing efforts, separation of
ownership and control typically introduces an additional positive effect
of competition on innovation when owners propose contracts.
6.2.2 Income Effects (Hermalin, 1992)
The conclusion that separation of ownership and control tends to
imply more positive effects of competition on investments is shared
by Hermalin (1992). However, the underlying economic intuition is
very different. Hermalin works with the appealing modification that
managers rather than firms propose contracts, and that contracts are
designed so as to make firms indifferent between accepting and not
accepting. Thus, the manager is the residual claimant to the fruits
of his effort. In the simplest case that additional competition cor-
responds to an additive reduction of gross profits, a manager with
decreasing marginal utility of income will therefore supply more effort
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as competition increases. Like Schmidt (1997), Hermalin therefore relies
on Property 1 of competition. He also extends the analysis to allow for
more general changes in competition where the underlying oligopoly
models are subject to the ambiguities of our basic model. In this con-
text, separation of ownership and control still works toward more pos-
itive effects of competition on efforts.6
Summary: Separation of ownership and control typically introduces
an additional positive effect of competition on innovation when man-
agers propose contracts.
6.2.3 Managerial Contracts under Endogenous
Entry (Raith, 2003)
In an interesting contribution, Raith (2003) modifies the basic set-up
in two dimensions simultaneously: He allows for endogenous entry and
for separation of ownership and control. In a first stage of the game, a
sufficiently large number of firms decide whether to enter. In the second
stage, the n firms that have decided to enter choose the contracts for
their managers. A contract has the form:
wi = si + bi(c¯ − ci),
where si is a salary and bi is a piece rate that depends on the firms
marginal costs relative to the industry average c¯. In the third stage,
agents simultaneously choose efforts ei so that:
ci = c¯ − ei − ui,
where ui is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and
variance σ2. The agents are assumed to have utility functions with
constant absolute risk aversion.
In the product market stage, firms compete on a unit circle a` la
Salop (1979). Consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed
with density m, whereas firms are located unidistantly at location
6Another argument for the view that separation of ownership and control tends to enhance
the positive effects of competition on investment goes back to Hart (1983). He argues that,
with competition, principals receive better information about the agents’ performance.
Therefore, it becomes less costly to induce efforts.
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zi ∈ {0, 1n , . . . , n−1n }. The net utility of the consumers has the form:
A − pi − t(x − zi)2, (6.1)
where A is a positive constant, pi is the price, and t is the
transportation-cost parameter.
It is instructive to first consider the corresponding investment game
for owner-managed firms with exogenous market participation. To
make it easier to embed the game into a principal — agent structure
later on, we take the uncertainty about competitor costs into account
and denote expected competitor costs as E(c). Straightforward calcu-
lations yield:
Mi =
t
n2
+
E(c) − ci
2
, (6.2a)
Qi =
m
n
+ nm
E(c) − ci
2t
. (6.2b)
Using θ = −t and yi = −ci, it is evident that θ has a negative effect
on Mi and no effect on ∂Mi∂yi . As required by Property 3, the effect on
∂Qi
∂yi
is positive, whereas the effect on Qi is positive only for leaders
(E(c) > ci). In symmetric situations where E(c) = ci, the investment
incentive is thus:
−∂Π
i
∂ci
= −M i∂Q
i
∂ci
− Qi∂M
i
∂ci
=
t
n2
nm
2t
+
m
n
1
2
=
m
n
. (6.3)
With the number of firms as an exogenous variable, the innovation
incentive thus depends positively on market size and negatively on the
number of firms. However, it is independent of transportation costs
(that is, the extent of product differentiation). For asymmetric firms,
competition has a positive effect on the investments of leaders and a
negative effect on those of laggards. These observations are very much
in line with the results of Section 4.2.
Before considering managerial incentives, let us add the possibility
of entry for an owner-managed firm. The number of firms is then no
longer an exogenous parameter, but is to be determined jointly with
investments. With entry costs of F , the number of firms entering would
be ( tmF )
1/3 (abstracting from integer constraints). With the equilibrium
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number of firms, Equation (6.3) therefore implies that innovation incen-
tives are mn = m
2/3(Ft )
1/3. Thus, incentives are increasing in market size
and entry costs, and decreasing in transportation costs.
Several points are worth mentioning. First, entry costs have a pos-
itive effect on innovation: By making entry unattractive, they increase
the incentives for the remaining firms in the market to invest. Second,
contrary to the case of an exogenous number of firms, innovation incen-
tives grow less than proportionally as market size increases. Third, even
though decreasing product differentiation has no effect on innovation
incentives in the symmetric case when the number of firms is exogenous,
the effect becomes positive with endogenous entry, reflecting the nega-
tive effect of decreasing product differentiation on the number of firms.
This reinforces the general point made in Section 6.1 that endogenous
entry tends to strengthen the case for a positive effect of competition
on investment. Again, the driving force is the negative effect of compe-
tition on gross profits (Property 1).
The comparative statics are robust to the introduction of manage-
rial incentives (Raith, 2003, Proposition 5). Increases in substitutabil-
ity, entry costs, and market size lead to higher piece rates and thus
efforts will be higher. In view of the preceding considerations, how-
ever, the source of the positive effects on cost reduction is actually the
possibility of free entry rather than the separation of ownership and
control. In fact, Raith’s model contains none of the elements discussed
above which introduce positive effects of separation of ownership and
control.7
It is interesting to note the different effects of different notions of
increasing competition: Decreasing product differentiation and increas-
ing entry costs both have a positive effect on innovation incentives and
hence on piece rates. However, whereas increasing product differentia-
tion corresponds unambiguously to an increase in competition, increas-
ing entry costs are usually associated with weaker competition (see,
e.g., Boone, 2008). In spite of this difference, the common underlying
logic is clear. Both parameter changes lead to a lower number of firms,
which foster the investments of the remaining firms.
7There are no income effects (Hermalin, 1992), information effects (Hart, 1983) or liquida-
tion effects (Schmidt, 1997).
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6.3 Growth
The relation between competition and innovation has also been
addressed in endogenous growth models. These models are typically for-
mulated in a multi-industry context, which makes comparison with the
preceding analysis difficult. However, they contain duopoly models like
those treated above as building blocks. To understand the statements
of the growth literature on the relation between competition and inno-
vation, a careful look at these duopoly models is helpful. Several obser-
vations will emerge. First, the competition parameters in these models
have some unusual properties that contradict our general approach.
Second, the basic ideas from the underlying oligopoly models go a long
way toward explaining the essence of the growth models. Third, the
multi-industry approach adds some new insights.
6.3.1 The Underlying Oligopoly Model(s)
Each of the growth models under consideration is built around a simple
duopoly model similar to the ones considered so far. This already sug-
gests that there are considerable degrees of freedom in the construction
of these growth models. Different functional forms and different notions
of “increasing competition” are used. Whereas Aghion et al. (1997)
compare homogeneous Bertrand and homogeneous Cournot competi-
tion, Aghion et al. (2001) consider the degree of substitutability as an
inverse measure of competition. In the following, I will focus on the
latter model.
The authors consider a duopoly where each firm has a demand
function:
qi =
p
1
α−1
i
p
1
α−1
i + p
1
α−1
j
.
The parameter α ∈ [0,1] is interpreted as a measure of the degree of
substitutability.8 Unit costs are assumed to be constant. The authors
show that gross profits of each firm are a function:
Π̂i(ci/cj ,α), (6.4)
8α is a monotone transformation of the elasticity of demand substitution.
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with the following properties:
1. Profits of firm i are decreasing in the cost ratio ci/cj for
α ∈ (0,1].
2. Profits are independent of the cost ratio and more generally
of marginal costs in the monopoly case (α = 0).
3. Joint profits are increasing in the degree of cost asymmetry
between firms.
While these properties turn out to be convenient, they are not very
plausible. It seems hard to imagine that profits only depend on cost
ratios and that there is no effect of costs at all when firms are monop-
olists: a decisive property of competition should be that the cost ratio
gets less relevant as competition becomes weaker, whereas lower own
costs should still increase profits even for the monopoly case. By assum-
ing away any such positive effects, the authors must necessarily obtain
a positive effect of moving from monopoly to competition, but there is
no convincing economic intuition behind it.
However, there are some more interesting results for the oligopoly
model. First, innovation incentives are strictly increasing in the degree
of competition for firms that are initially “neck-and-neck”, that is, have
the same marginal costs. Second, for leaders or laggards incremental
innovation incentives can become inverse U-shaped in the degree of
competition.
6.3.2 Further Considerations
The authors then extend the model in three ways that differ from the
basic structure treated so far.
First, innovations are treated in a somewhat different way than in
the IO literature. Firms can advance stepwise, starting from relative
costs of 1. A firm that is n steps ahead of the competitor has relative
costs of γ−n, where γ > 1. An innovation that moves the firm up one
step thus corresponds to a multiplication of the cost ratio by 1γ . Second,
the R&D model is stochastic. Firms that are at the technological fron-
tier (leaders or neck-and-neck firms) can choose the R&D intensity x at
a cost of ψ(x) = βx2/2, where β > 0. The firm then moves one step
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ahead on the technology ladder with Poisson hazard rate x. Laggards
that exert the same effort move ahead with a higher hazard rate x + h,
where h should be thought of as reflecting the extent of R&D spillovers.
Third, the authors embed their model into a setting with many indus-
tries, each of which consists of a duopoly as described. They consider
a large number of industries, each of which is as described above.
Note that, because the costs of moving from step n to n + 1 are
independent of n and the size of the cost reduction is decreasing in
n, firms with a high initial efficiency need to incur greater investment
costs to reach a marginal cost reduction of a given size. This reasonable
property has an important implication: Firms in neck-and-neck situa-
tions invest more than leaders. In view of the discussion in Section 5.1,
however, one should at least recall the possibility that leaders invest
more than laggards because they have higher benefits of investment.
The relevance of the different investment technologies only becomes
apparent when general equilibrium considerations are taken into
account. To analyze the total effect of competition on innovation, it
is no longer sufficient to investigate the effects of competition on the
investments of firms in neck-and-neck and leader-laggard constella-
tions, respectively. In addition, one must take into account the effects
of competition on the probability of being in the different states.
Here, the authors arrive at very intuitive results: Because competi-
tion increases the firms’ incentives to escape neck-and-neck constel-
lations, intense competition also means that neck-and-neck states are
rare. Thus, intense competition drives firms into the leader-laggard con-
stellation where firms have relatively weak innovation incentives. These
countervailing effects of competition imply that growth rates often have
an inverse U-shape: Reflecting the assumption that monopolists have
no innovation incentives, a small dose of competition is always good
for growth, whereas too much competition can be bad.
6.3.3 Comments
The analysis of Aghion et al. (2001) is interesting for a number of rea-
sons. First, it emphasizes differences in the effects of competitions on
investments, depending on whether the industry is of a neck-and-neck
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type or has a leader-laggard structure. Second, on a related note,
it shows that competition may also affect growth by the effects on
industry composition. The paper deserves credit for these two related
contributions.
A more problematic issue is the robustness of the inverse U-shape.
Because the underlying oligopoly model is constructed so that there
must be a positive effect of competition at least for low initial amounts
of competition, there are reasons to be skeptical. As we have seen above,
many more plausible models do not have this property.
Even if one hesitates to take the inverse-U conclusion for granted,
one can still accept that the paper is making an important point: Even
in a situation where competition has a clear positive effect on invest-
ment in neck-and-neck situations in the underlying oligopoly model by
assumption, industry composition effects can lead to a negative effect
if competition becomes too strong. In this sense, it may be regarded as
strength of the paper that it starts from an oligopoly model with an
in-built bias toward a positive effect of competition on investment. Nev-
ertheless, it would be interesting to see how the analysis would work
out in a context where competition does not have a positive effect
on investments in the underlying oligopoly model in a neck-and-neck
situation.
Another point in favor of the paper is that, apart from the intuitive
appeal of the inverse U-shape, it also seems to have some empirical
support. We shall get back to this issue in Section 7.
Summary: Recent growth models predict an inverse-U relation
between competition and investments. This effect is driven by a combi-
nation of a specific choice of oligopoly model, the investment technology
and an industry composition effect.
6.4 Product Innovations
While the relation between competition and process innovation has
been studied a lot, the corresponding issues for product innovations
have received less attention. In the following, I shall nevertheless
provide some thoughts on the relation between competition and prod-
uct innovation, including a brief review of the relevant papers. I shall
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confine myself to innovations of existing products that raise the quality
level in the sense that they increase the willingness of all consumers to
pay for the product.9
In the following, I will distinguish into two dimensions:
1. Do innovating firms continue to sell the old product as well
as the new product?
2. Are the products homogeneous except for the quality level,
or is there also horizontal differentiation?
6.4.1 Product Replacements
The case that is closest to the analysis of process innovations concerns
vertical product innovations that replace existing products fully.
Pure vertical differentiation First consider the case that there is
only one dimension of product differentiation, that is, firms are homoge-
neous except for the quality differences. Then a slightly better product
is further away from the competitor (for a leader) or closer (for a lag-
gard). For instance, take the model of Shaked and Sutton (1982) in
the simple version presented by (Tirole, 1988, Ch. 7.5). There are two
firms who differ with respect to their quality level Ai, where A1 > A2.
Consumer utility is given by γAi − pi, where γ is distributed uni-
formly between γ ≥ 0 and γ = γ + 1. Tirole shows that, under some
technical assumptions that include “sufficient consumer heterogeneity”
(γ − 2γ ≥ 0),
Q1=
2γ¯ − γ
3
; Q2 =
γ¯ − 2γ
3
;
M1=
(2γ¯ − γ)2∆1
9
; M2 =
(γ¯ − 2γ)2∆1
9
.
Now suppose firms are allowed to invest in quality improvements.
A full-fledged treatment of the effects of increasing competition on inno-
vation incentives in this setting is beyond the scope of the paper.10
9One could also consider the introduction of new products that are horizontally rather than
vertically differentiated from their predecessors.
10Specifically, this would require an adequate definition of increasing competition in this
context. One natural way to go would be to define increasing competition in terms of
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Nevertheless, one important observation suffices to show why the anal-
ysis will differ substantially from the case of process innovations: Con-
trary to that case, both firms face higher margins and gross profits
when the leader innovates, and both firms face lower margins when the
laggard innovates. It is thus clear that the economics for the case of
vertical quality improvements can differ substantially from the case of
cost reductions: One would expect an increasingly competitive envi-
ronment to induce activities that “soften competition” by increasing
differentiation.
Vertical and horizontal differentiation As an illustration, con-
sider the Salop model discussed in Section 6.2. For simplicity, specify
m = 1 and n = 2. Modify the expression for consumer net utilities to
allow for firm-specific willingness to pay Ai (i = 1,2):
Ui = Ai − pi − t(x − zi)2.
An increase in Ai can then be regarded as a vertical product inno-
vation. It is simple to show that, with ∆i = Ai − Aj , the expressions
for outputs and margins become
Mi =
t
4
+
∆i
3
,
Qi =
1
2
+
2
3
∆i
t
. (6.5a)
It is immediate that these terms are almost the same as the corre-
sponding terms for cost reduction.11 It is thus not surprising that
the qualitative properties obtained for the effects of competition on
process innovation incentives in Section 6.2 carry over to the case of
product innovations. For the product innovation incentive, we obtain
∂Πi
∂Ai
= 49t∆i +
1
3 . Hence, increasing competition has a positive effect on
the innovation incentives if and only if a firm is a leader (∆i > 0). As
in the case of process innovations, this reflects the fact that the output
effects of greater competition (reduction of t) are positive for leaders
and negative for laggards.
properties of the density of consumers (that is, the values of γ¯ and γ): When γ¯ − 2γ is
low, so are margins.
11Let ∆Ci = cj − ci. Then Mi = t4 +
∆Ci
2 and Qi = 0.5 +
∆Ci
t
.
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Changes in the number of firms Dubey and Wu (2002) consider
the relation between the number of firms and innovation incentives in
a setting where firms initially all produce low-quality products. Before
setting prices, they can then decide whether to make a stochastic invest-
ment which, with some probability, improves the quality of the product
by a fixed amount. Firms face a continuum of consumers who differ in
their valuation of quality. The authors show that innovation incentives
have an inverse U-shape in a very specific parameterization. On the
one hand, when the number of firms become very large, the incentives
to invest become very small, for reasons that are similar to the case
of process innovation (compare our discussion of the entry liberaliza-
tion example in Section 4.1.1). On the other hand, when the number of
firms is small, the replacement effect kicks in, and firms earn high prof-
its even without innovation. The example seems plausible, but it is not
entirely clear to which extent the result is really driven by the fact that
product rather than process innovations are considered. As argued ear-
lier, standard models typically predict a negative effect of an increase
in the number of firms on process innovation. However, these models
differ in more than one dimension from the example considered here.
6.4.2 Additional Products
Several authors allow firms that have innovated to produce the old
version of the good along with the new version. Doing so will allow the
firms to price discriminate between consumers with high willingness to
pay who receive the new good at a high price and consumers with low
willingness to pay who receive the old good at a low price.
Pure vertical differentiation For instance, Greenstein and Ramey
(1998) consider product innovations in a model of vertical product
differentiation a` la Shaked and Sutton (1982) as sketched above. In
this setting, the authors compare the innovation incentives of firms
under varying degrees of competition. Translated to our notation, they
consider innovation as an activity that introduces a new good with
quality AiH which is above the old quality A
i
L. In one of several com-
parisons, θ = θL refers to a case of a monopolist. His gross profit is
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Πi(AiL,θL) if he sells only the old low-quality product. If he innovates,
he obtains a total profit of Πi(AiH ,θL) which consists of sales from both
the high-quality and the low-quality product.
The case θ = θH corresponds to the existence of several perfectly
competitive firms. If one of these firms does not invest, it obtains gross
profits of Πi(AiL,θH) = 0. If it innovates, its profits Π
i(AiH ,θH) are
those of a firm with a high-quality and a low-quality product fac-
ing a competitive fringe of firms producing low-quality products. It
is straightforward to see that the innovation incentives Πi(AiH ,θ) −
Πi(AiL,θ) are higher with higher competition if and only if:
Πi(AiL,θL) > Π
i(AiH ,θL) − Πi(AiH ,θH). (6.6)
The left-hand side reflects the familiar “replacement effect” that
captures the positive effect of ex ante competition on innovation
(Section 2): A monopolist who produces the new and the old product
must take into consideration that even without the innovation, he would
obtain the profits Πi(AiL,θL) from the sales of the old good. This effect
provides a reason why he would invest less than a competitive firm.
On the other hand, there is also a reason why a competitive firm
might invest less: The competitive firm, even after innovation, will
still face the pressure from the fringe firms. Thus, it will earn less
after the innovation than the monopolist who carries out the same
innovation. This corresponds to the negative effect of ex post com-
petition on investments discussed in Section 2, and it is captured by
the term Πi(AiH ,θL) − Πi(AiH ,θH). Of course such an effect also arises
for process innovations, but the possibility of price coordination for
multiproduct monopolists in the product innovation setting makes it
more pronounced.
Greenstein and Ramey (1998) then go on to check which of the
two terms in Equation (6.6) is larger. For drastic innovations, they
still obtain the result from the process innovation case that compe-
tition leads to greater incentives. For nondrastic innovations, it turns
out that the innovation incentives are identical in the two cases. Hence,
the intensity of competition has no effect on innovation. The authors
also show that a suitable monotone perturbation of the utility func-
tion derived from the model of Shaked and Sutton (1982) changes the
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demand structure in such a way that competition even leads to greater
innovation incentives.
Vertical and horizontal differentiation Chen and Schwartz
(2008) modify the approach of Greenstein and Ramey (1998) by con-
sidering products that are differentiated horizontally, located at the
ends of the Hotelling interval (with uniformly distributed consumers).
The product innovation leads to an increase in the willingness to pay
by the same constant amount for each consumer. The authors compare
the innovation incentives in three settings:
1. A monopoly where one firm produces both products.
2. A duopoly where an incumbent produces one product and
only another firm can innovate and then produce the new
product.
3. Competition where the equilibrium price for the old prod-
uct equals the marginal cost.
It is fairly straightforward to show that innovation incentives for
the duopoly are always higher than for competition: In both cases, the
potential innovator has no profits if it does not innovate; if it innovates,
it is better off if it faces a duopolistic competitor than a competitive
fringe.
The comparison between innovation incentives in the monopoly and
duopoly cases is more subtle. It is driven by a simple observation: When
both products are sold by the same firm, an increase in the value of the
innovative product leads to a price increase for the other good, whereas
a competing duopolist would reduce the price of the old good. Thus
as the value of a product grows, so does the “coordination advantage”
that a monopolist can engage in joint pricing for both goods (which
works toward larger incentives for the monopolist). However, the same
is true of the “diversion effect”, which is essentially the replacement
effect that the innovating monopolist loses at least part of the profits
that he originally earned on the old good: The more valuable the new
good, the lower are the profits that the monopolist earns from the
old good. It turns out that the former effect always dominates. This
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illustrates the possibility that, in a horizontally differentiated setting,
innovation incentives can be stronger for a monopolist.
Both Greenstein and Ramey (1998) and Chen and Schwartz (2008)
claim that their results reverse the corresponding results for product
innovation. It appears, however, that they are making the claim by com-
parison with Arrow (1962), who focuses on the effects of ex ante compe-
tition. It seems that the differences in the predictions really result from
the fact that the authors are also considering effects on ex post com-
petition. As we have seen throughout the monograph, such effects may
also result for process innovations. For a cleaner comparison, it would
be helpful to juxtapose the models with otherwise identical models of
process innovation.
6.4.3 The Direction of Technical Change
Of course, firms are usually not restricted to carrying out either a prod-
uct or a process innovation. Instead, they have to decide on how much
of each activity they want to carry out. Then, it becomes interesting
to ask how competition affects the choice between product and pro-
cess innovation. Bonanno and Haworth (1998) approach this question
in the Mussa–Rosen setting mentioned in Section 4.2.2. While they do
not allow firms to choose arbitrary combinations of product and pro-
cess innovations, they at least endogenize the choice between product
and process innovations. They show that, as competition switches from
Cournot to Bertrand, the high-quality firm will tend to switch from
process innovation to a product innovation that increases the quality
of its product, thereby increasing the extent of vertical differentiation.
The result is intuitive: In a setting where prices are strategic comple-
ments, process innovations tend to induce price cuts of the competitor,
whereas product innovations that lead to more differentiation soften
competition and induce price increases. This makes product innova-
tions relatively more attractive as competition increases.
6.4.4 Summary
All in all, the theory of the relation between competition and product
innovations seems a lot less developed than the corresponding theory
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for process innovations. In principle, of course, the tools for the anal-
ysis exist: Models of vertical product differentiation are suitable for
addressing the question. To improve the understanding of the different
effects of competition on product and process innovation, it will most
likely be helpful to start from a decomposition such as Equation (3.2),
which immediately reveals an important difference between product
and process innovations: At least in some settings (e.g., Shaked and
Sutton (1982) only quality investments of leaders increase own margins,
whereas the investments of laggards tend to reduce them, because they
intensify competition. A more thorough analysis of the relation there-
fore seems called for.
6.5 Other Determinants
Overall, the extensions of this section suggest that the basic model
of Section 3 may underestimate the positive effects of competition on
investment. For instance, with free entry, product innovations and sep-
aration of ownership and control, additional sources of positive effects
arise. In Schmutzler (2010), I provide several other thoughts on factors
supporting a positive relation between competition and innovation. I
summarize the main ideas here.
Spillovers: A massive literature discusses innovation incentives in
situations with spillovers where competing firms gain access to a part
of the knowledge produced by the innovator.12 It has long been recog-
nized that spillovers have adverse effects on innovation incentives, at
least in simple settings. More intense competition often reinforces these
adverse effects. The most important condition for the conclusion is the
following:
Property 4: As competition increases, a marginal cost reduction
of the competitor has stronger negative effects on own gross profits.
Intuitively, as competition increases, innovators are more concerned
about the fact that they are strengthening the competitor by innovating
more.13
12See for instance Spence (1984), D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and Leahy and
Neary (1997).
13Obviously, this condition needs to be taken with a grain of salt. While it makes perfect
sense for changes from small to intermediate competition, it is a lot less palatable for
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Cumulative investments: Compared with the one-shot case,
cumulative investments work toward positive effects of competition
on investment. As discussed in Section 5.1, investments are typically
strategic substitutes, at least when spillovers are not too strong. Also,
investments of the competitor are not desired. Thus, following the Top-
Dog logic of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow et al. (1985), it is
useful to invest in early stages, so as to make the competitor invest less
in the future. Intuitively, as competition increases, this strategic effect
becomes more important, which introduces an additional reason why
competition might have a positive effect on investment.
The initial level of competition: There is a quite common
rough intuition that, while some competition is good for invest-
ments, “excessive competition” may have negative effects, suggesting
an inverted-U relation between competition and investment. The exam-
ple of Section 4.1.2 shows that such a general statement cannot be
supported in our partial equilibrium framework: In this example, a U-
shape rather than an inverse U-shape emerges. The intuition in this
particular case is as follows. The negative margin effect of competition
becomes less pronounced when initial competition is high: With high
competition, margins are close to zero, so that further reductions do
not reduce margins much more.14
However, as we saw in Section 6.3, which reports results by Aghion
et al. (1997), there are indeed cases with inverse-U relations. A general
statement on the effects of the initial level of competition on the effects
of further increases in competition is therefore not possible without
qualification.
Vertical industry structures: Recent research has dealt with
the incentives for R&D investments in network industries and succes-
sive oligopolies.15 In Schmutzler (2010), I sketch how the effects of
downstream competition on downstream investments depend on the
changes from intermediate to intense competition: For very intense competition, the level
of profits may be so small that the adverse effects of increases competitor efficiency
become negligible.
14Technically, margins are a convex function of the competition parameter.
15See Bu¨hler and Schmutzler (2005, 2008) for downstream investment and Chen and Sap-
pington (2009) for upstream investments.
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presence of imperfect competition in the upstream market. Roughly
speaking, imperfect upstream competition tends to reduce the effects
of downstream competition on investment, because changes in demand
for R&D inputs affect their price.16
16The effects of downstream competition on upstream investments are more complex and
add further countervailing sources (Schmutzler, 2010).
7
Evidence
Doing justice to the large empirical literature on the relation between
competition and investment is beyond the scope of this monograph that
focuses on theory. The following short reflections have a much more
restricted purpose. Rather than surveying the empirical literature, I
will start by formulating some ideas that follow from the previous theo-
retical considerations and are relevant for empirical research. I will then
ask to which extent these ideas are reflected in the existing empirical
literature. For reasons that will hopefully become apparent, I consider
both field research and experiments.
The theoretical analysis leads to the following implications for
empirical research.
1. It may be of limited use to test the relation between compe-
tition and investment. As emphasized above, the predicted
relation depends on the details of the underlying model,
and, to a large extent, the differences can be explained by
economic intuition. In view of the initial examples, it may
make a substantial difference whether one looks at entry
liberalization, decreasing substitutability or globalization
as examples of increasing competition. Thus one should
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view empirical research on competition and innovation
not so much as an attempt to deal with the second-most
tested hypothesis in industrial organization, but as a broad
research project that deals with tests of related, but distinct
hypotheses.
2. On a related note, even when one confines attention to
a comparatively narrow concept of increasing competition
(such as an increase in the substitutability of products or
a reduction in transportation costs), the analysis strongly
suggests that additional factors will determine the predicted
relation. Possible candidates include the ease of entry Sec-
tion (6.1), the ownership structure of the firm Section (6.2),
whether firms are leaders or laggards Section (5.2), whether
one considers product or process innovations Section (6.4),
etc. Thus, one would hope that empirical research takes
these factors into account.
3. The theoretical analysis not only provides predictions for
the relation between competition and investment, it also
suggests more specifically through which channels compe-
tition affects investments. In the basic model, competition
impacts on innovation incentives via its effect on output,
margins, output sensitivity, and cost-pass-through (Sec-
tion 4.2). In the model of cumulative investments, there
are additional effects that come through strategic effects
of present investments on future investments (Section 6.5).
In the model with endogenous market participation (Sec-
tion 6.1), the reason why the effects of more intense compe-
tition (defined as closer substitutability between products)
on investments tend to be more positive than with an exoge-
nously given set of firms is that intense competition tends to
reduce the number of firms in the market. It would greatly
enhance the value of empirical tests of the relation between
competition and investment if we had any evidence about
which of the transmission channels exposed in theory are
responsible for the observed relation between competition
and investment.
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7.1 Field Evidence
During the last 50 years, many authors have addressed the relation
between competition and innovation empirically. This research has
been summarized and discussed in several surveys already, including
Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Baldwin and Scott (1987), Cohen and
Levin (1989), Cohen (1995), and Gilbert (2006). In spite of what has
been said above, at least until recently this research does seem to have
been directed toward finding the relation between competition and
investment. There are several related strands of literature that deal
with the relation between innovation and measures of firm size, mar-
ket share, or industry concentration, which are meant to capture the
intensity of competition.
Neither of these related strands of literature maps easily into the
theoretical discussions summarized above. Firm size is often captured
by sales volume. In the theoretical literature, sales are endogenous,
determined in the last stage of the innovation game, after firms have
chosen their innovation levels. The relation between firm size and the
theoretical measures of θ is unclear.
Industry concentration is also potentially endogenous. Similarly,
it is not clear what the relation between a firm’s market share and
its investment activities should be, unless one is sufficiently specific
about details. A simple argument for a clear relation could be made
in a setting with an exogenous number of perfectly symmetric firms,
where the market share is the reciprocal of the number of firms.
Then one would typically expect a strictly positive relation between
concentration and process innovation, but with asymmetric firms the
relation is much less clear.1
1For instance, suppose in a duopoly a higher market share of a firm reflects lower marginal
costs. Then the relation between market share and process innovation essentially boils
down to the issue of the differences in the innovations of leaders and laggards. As argued in
Section 5.1, it is quite conceivable that leaders invest more than laggards, because they face
higher benefits from cost reductions. This would indeed correspond to a positive relation
between market share and innovation. On the other hand, leaders may want to invest
less, because the costs of investing are higher. Also, a positive correlation between market
share and innovation may reflect market share gains from innovation rather than positive
effects of market share on innovation. Finally, omitted variables may pose a substantial
problem. It is quite possible that firms with high market share may have some exogenous
characteristics that make them better innovators.
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Some of these issues have been pointed out long ago (see, e.g.,
Phillips, 1966), and it has been widely accepted that they are most
likely to be relevant for the failure of empirical analysis to uncover a
clear relation between competition and innovation. More recent empir-
ical research has therefore moved in two related directions. First, it has
tried to identify competition variables that relate more closely to the-
oretical concepts and are less likely to be endogenous. Second, to some
extent, it has abandoned the search for a general relationship between
competition and innovation, focussing more on identifying which fac-
tors determine the nature of the relation. For instance, the literature
has highlighted potential differences in the effects of competition on the
investments of leaders and laggards and it has also begun to separate
the effects of competition on product innovations from those on process
innovations.
7.1.1 Selected Examples
I will provide some examples for these developments in the following.
Positive Effects of Competition on Innovation Nickell (1996)
starts from the premise that there is a widespread belief “. . . that
competition exerts downward pressure on costs, reduces slack, pro-
vides incentives for the efficient organization of production and even
drives innovation forward (p.724/725)”. In line with the arguments
made above, he is skeptical about the existing theoretical foundations
for this belief and about solid empirical evidence in favor of it.2
He therefore uses a panel with data from the U.K. manufacturing
industry between 1972 and 1986 to provide evidence in favor of the
hypothesis. He uses various different measures of competition. He not
only includes firm-level market shares and measures of concentration
and import penetration at the market level, he also uses survey-based
measures. He finds evidence that competition is indeed associated with
higher total factor productivity growth. He acknowledges the possibility
2However, he acknowledges some supportive anecdotal evidence. For instance, he points
to the case studies of Porter (1990) who shows that domestic competition has a positive
effect on the ability of firms to be successful in international markets.
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of reverse causality, but he argues that this should reduce the measured
impact, because firms with faster growth of total factor productivity
would become more dominant, thereby reducing competition.
On inverse U-shape Aghion et al.’s (2005, 2009) is one of the clear-
est attempts to test a sophisticated theoretical model with field data.
The authors build from the work of Aghion et al. (2001) presented in
Section 6.3. To repeat, their model makes several testable predictions:
H1 There is an inverted-U relationship between product market
competition and the average innovation rate.
H2 As competition increases, industries tend to be in a neck-
and-neck state less often.
H3 The closer firms are to each other, the stronger is the positive
effect of product market competition on innovation and the
larger the average number of innovations.
Hence, the model not only contains a hypothesis on the relation
between competition and innovation, but additional hypotheses that
relate to the precise mechanism: By H2 and H3, even though, for a given
set of neck-and-neck firms, an increase in competition increases innova-
tion, a countervailing force arises because competition drives industries
into states where innovations arise less often.
The empirical test confirms not only the central inverse-U
hypothesis H1, but also the related hypotheses H2 and H3. The anal-
ysis obtains credibility because the authors do not restrict themselves
to measures of competition that are suspect of endogeneity. While they
choose the Lerner index as an explanatory variable, they also intro-
duce a set of policy instruments that provide exogenous variation in
competition. These instruments included measures from the EU single
market program, large-scale privatizations and measures imposed by
the Monopoly and Merger Commission.
Competition and endogenous entry Syverson’s (2004) is a
theory-based empirical contribution that relates closely to several of
the issues discussed in this monograph, even though it does not deal
directly with innovation. The paper investigates the relation between
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local competition and the productivity distributions within the ready
mixed concrete-industry. It explores the variation in these distribu-
tions across geographical regions in the United States. It shows that
in high-demand regions, the productivity distribution has more weight
on high realizations, and it has lower dispersion. Syverson explains the
observation using a variant of the model of Raith (2003) presented in
Section 6.2. To repeat, this model is based on the Salop model with
exogenous cost asymmetries. Syverson considers the effect of an exoge-
nous demand increase. As this demand increase attracts further entry,
the substitution possibilities for consumers increase (even though there
is no change in the substitution parameter as such). As a result, rela-
tively inefficient firms have a harder time surviving, so that the distri-
bution of firms in the market changes in a way corresponding to the
empirical observations.
The effect described by Syverson relies purely on firm selection.
Hence, to explain the observations in the paper, it is not necessary to
refer to any relation between competition and innovation. However, the
observations at least confirm important ingredients of Raith’s (2003)
model: The changes in exogenous parameters induce an adjustment
in the number (and distribution) of firms that is consistent with the
model. Whether the increases in productivity actually come from a
positive effect on innovation or merely from a selection effect remains
an open issue.
Entry threat, leaders and laggards Aghion et al. 2009 provides
an interesting investigation of the effects of foreign entry on the pro-
ductivity of incumbents. They use various policy reforms to instrument
for the entry threat. The authors show that the threat of entry induces
greater innovations in industries that are close to the technological
frontier, whereas it discourages entry in industries that are lagging
behind. This is broadly consistent with the patterns exposed in Sec-
tion 4.2, where I argued that increasing competition tends to increase
the investments of leaders rather than those of laggards.
Product and Process innovations Kretschmer et al. (2008)
emphasize the multi-dimensional nature of innovations: In line with
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the discussion in Section 6.4, they argue that competition may affect
product and process innovations in different ways. More specifically, the
authors consider a data set for the French automobile retail industry.3
They analyze the effects of a change in European competition policy
toward vertical restraints. Essentially, this policy increased competition
by abolishing territorial exclusivity of dealers.
The main results are as follows. Liberalization has a positive effect
on product innovation. This effect is mediated through an increase in
the scale of operations which correlates with higher returns to prod-
uct innovation. The effect on process innovations is negative, which
reflects a negative relation between product and process innovation.
Though these results are not motivated directly by any of the above
models, they are broadly consistent with the ideas discussed in Sec-
tion 6.4, where it was argued that, as competition increases, product
innovations become relatively more attractive. Also, the authors pay
particular attention to the interaction between innovation strategies
and the scale of the firm. Consistent with the discussion of transmis-
sion mechanisms in Section 4.2 (in particular, the output effect), process
innovations and large scale tend to be correlated.
7.1.2 Conclusions
The gulf between the early empirical research on competition and inno-
vation and the models presented in this monograph was substantial.
The search for correlation between concentration and various measures
of R&D activities seemed too far removed from the theoretical consid-
erations.
More recently, there has been a convergence between theoretical
and empirical research. Several papers attempt to find measures of
competition that are closer to the theoretical concepts, and are less
prone to endogeneity problems. Also, several recent studies take into
account that the predicted effect of competition on investment will
depend on firm and industry characteristics. This is exemplified by
3For process innovations, the authors use the adoption of certain human resource software;
for product innovations, they use the adoption of software packages that improved the
customization of orders.
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the studies that distinguish between leaders and laggards or between
product and process innovations. Also, careful studies that deal with
particular industries are promising in this respect, because they remind
us of the possibility that there may be quite different patterns in dif-
ferent industries. Finally, it is encouraging that some papers not only
aim at finding the relation between competition and innovation, but
also test-related hypotheses which provide some support for the spe-
cific mechanisms advanced by theory.
These improvements not only reflect changes in the empirical anal-
ysis, but also in the underlying models. Not all the theoretical models
presented in this monograph are particularly well-suited for empirical
analysis. Models with an exogenous number of symmetric firms are
unlikely to provide a very useful basis for empirical analysis. A shift
from Cournot to Bertrand competition is hard to translate into empir-
ical categories. It is clear that our theoretical understanding of the
relationship would have remained highly incomplete without the more
recent extensions to asymmetric firms and endogenous entry. Also, it is
hardly surprising that the more recent theory-based empirical analysis
made heavy use of these extensions.
The recent progress notwithstanding, the match between theory
and empirical analysis is still not perfect. I will therefore briefly report
on a complementary approach to testing theories of competition and
innovation.
7.2 Experimental Evidence
A small group of authors has used laboratory experiments to shed
light on the strategic issues related to innovation. For instance, Suetens
(2005) and Halbheer et al. (2009) confirm the well-known negative
effects of spillovers on investments. Halbheer et al. (2009) also provide
support for weak increasing dominance, as discussed in Section 5.1.
In the following, I shall, however, focus on the small group of authors
who have dealt directly with the relation between competition and
investment.
There are some obvious shortcomings of using experiments in this
context. Most importantly, a laboratory experiment is always a test of
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one out of many conceivable models of competition and innovation. It
cannot inform us about which model is adequate. Expressed differently,
if we find a particular effect of competition on investment in any single
laboratory experiment, we cannot take this as any serious evidence in
favor of such a relation in the field, as long as we know that there
are many other models around that predict the opposite. As the paper
should have shown, there is not much a priori reason to favor any one
model over another one.
Precisely for this reason, however, laboratory experiments can play
a useful role. They allow the researcher to communicate the rules of the
game to the players in exactly the way prescribed by theory, and they
allow the researcher to carry out one-parameter variations of the envi-
ronment that make it very credible that changing behavior in different
treatments must necessarily result from this particular treatment varia-
tion. Thus, if we find that a particular effect that is predicted by theory
is actually observed in the lab, it provides us with some support for the
idea that, if such subjects are ever confronted with a structurally similar
setting in the field, they might behave in a similar fashion. Conversely,
if certain effects that we take for granted in theory are not observed in
the lab, then we should take this as a warning that the effects may not
be very robust.
7.2.1 Number Effects
The entry liberalization example of Section 4.1.1 predicts a negative
effect of an increase of the number of players on investments for Cournot
competition. This effect also played an important role for the analysis
of innovation incentives under endogenous entry Section (6.1).
Darai et al. (2010) consider homogenous goods models with two
and four firms. They show that an increase in the number of firms
reduces investments, as predicted. They also make an analogous com-
parison for the Bertrand game. The game is similar to an all-pay auc-
tion, because only the firm with the lowest marginal costs will earn
a positive profit, even though everybody incurs the investment costs.
Contrary to standard all-pay auctions, the game typically has asym-
metric pure-strategy equilibria. In addition, symmetric mixed-strategy
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equilibria arise. No matter which benchmark is used, theory predicts
a negative number effect of investments. Even though the point pre-
dictions are not quite consistent with the observations (there is mild
overinvestment in both the two-player and the four-player case), the
comparative statics are clearly confirmed for Cournot as well as for
Bertrand competition.4
7.2.2 Increasing Substitutability
Sacco and Schmutzler (2010) took the Cournot model of differentiated
price competition sketched in Section 4.1.2 to the lab, considering both
symmetric and asymmetric settings and one-stage and two-stage treat-
ments.5 In both cases, they compared the investments for weak com-
petition (θ = 1/10) to intermediate competition (θ = 2/3) and intense
competition (θ = 1). The one-stage treatments provide some evidence
for the predicted U-shape: In the symmetric case and for leaders in the
asymmetric case, investments are lowest for intermediate competition.
However, in both cases, the positive effect of moving from intermedi-
ate to intense competition is insignificant. For laggards, the predicted
negative effect of competition on investment holds, but it is also less
pronounced: Laggards overinvest, and more so for θ = 1.
More substantial deviations from the theoretical predictions arise in
the two-stage treatments, where Sacco and Schmutzler (2010) only con-
sider the symmetric cases with θ = 0.67 and θ = 1. There, contrary to
the one-stage treatments, subjects underinvest. The deviation is more
pronounced for intense competition, so that moving from intermediate
to intense competition has no significant effect on investments.
Cournot versus Bertrand Darai et al. (2010) also deal with the
effects of switching from Cournot to Bertrand investments, considering
both the case of two and of four players: Increasing competition in
4 In the same spirit, two early contributions of Isaac and Reynolds (1988, 1992) deal with
patent races and show that an increase in competition in the sense of a larger number of
firms indeed has a negative effect on investments
5The two-stage treatments correspond exactly to the theoretical structure of the game.
In the one-stage treatments, for each investment vector, subjects obtained the payoffs
from the Nash equilibrium of the induced subgame. This approach allows to understand
deviations from the subgame-perfect equilibrium in the investment game more clearly.
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this sense has a positive effect on investments. In the two-player case,
this is consistent with the theoretical prediction. In the four-player
case, the experimental observation contradicts the prediction. Broadly
speaking, the analysis leads to the tentative conclusion that increasing
competition might have positive behavioral effects on investment.
7.2.3 Conclusions
Even though only a fairly small number of experiments on competition
and investment have been carried out so far, some suggestive conclu-
sions are possible.
The effects of competition and investment are broadly confirmed,
with some qualifications. The negative number effects of competition
come out clearly. The U-shaped and negative relations in the specific
differentiated goods example are broadly consistent with the obser-
vations, with some qualifications regarding significance levels. When
comparing Cournot and Bertrand investment games, there seems to
be more reason for skepticism: Broadly, there tends too much invest-
ment in the Bertrand setting, so that even in cases when moving from
Cournot to Bertrand competition should reduce investments, it has
the opposite effect. This may have something to do with the complex
strategic situation in Bertrand investment games, which makes it very
unclear what optimal behavior is. However, even though this situation
is presumably extreme in the Bertrand case, the strong sensitivity of
optimal decisions to those of other players is an important feature of
intense competition.
The possibly most interesting observation does not relate specifi-
cally to the relation between competition and experiments in such a
simple setting, but to the well-known strategic effects of intertemporal
decisions that drive a large part of the theoretical industrial organi-
zation literature (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984; Bulow et al., 1985). It
seems that, while subjects understand how second-period actions (e.g.,
outputs) should vary with own first-period actions (e.g., investments),
they hardly seem to adjust to the first-period actions of competitors.6
6The finding that the strategic effects of investments are imperfectly understood by sub-
jects is also familiar from other two-stage models (see Engelmann and Normann, 2007;
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It is probably not a good sign for the underlying theory that the funda-
mental strategic mechanisms cannot even be observed in a very clean
and stylized two-stage setting.
for strategic trade models a´ la Brander and Spencer (1987), Huck et al., 2004; for the
delegation game of Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Oechssler and Schuhmacher, 2004; for the
debt model of Brander and Lewis, 1986).
8
Conclusions
If this monograph has a conclusion, it is probably that understanding
the relation between competition and innovation is not a particularly
well-defined task. Rather, there appears to be a set of separate, but
related questions which are often addressed under the same heading.
To make sure that it is indeed beneficial to regard these questions as
belonging to one broad research project, it is crucial to understand
what the commonalities and the differences of these various questions
are. This monograph made an attempt to do so. I hope this approach
has helped to clarify why there is so little consensus on the relation
between competition and innovation. I also hope it has contributed to
understanding which factors are conducive to a positive or negative
relation, respectively.
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